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Why  evolution has to  matter to cognitive  psychology and to philosophy of mind 
 
Joëlle Proust 
CNRS 
 
Philosophy of mind has essentially been shaped by philosophers of language, 
epistemologists and philosophers of science, such as Hilary Putnam, Donald 
Davidson, John Searle, Jerry Fodor and Fred Drestke. Much valuable work has been 
done in their wake, in the logical, semantic and pragmatic analysis of belief-desire 
attribution, in the theory of intentionality and in the analysis of meaning as well as in 
the exploration of the mental content involved in all kinds of propositional attitudes 
(perception, memory, emotion, etc.).  
This line of research permeated various other domains in cognitive science, 
such as the development of mentalisation, the psychology of action and of reasoning,   
psycholinguistics, cognitive anthropology  and  A.I.  Growing suspicions were raised 
however that an exclusively language-oriented view of the mind, focussing on the 
characterization of anhistorical, static mental states through their propositional 
contents, was  hardly compatible with what is currently known of brain architecture 
and did not fare well when confronted with results from many behavioral studies of 
mental functions. My aim in what follows is to show that these forms of  
dissatisfaction stem from the fact that brain evolution and development were either 
entirely ignored, or insufficiently taken into account in inquiries about the structure of 
mental contents. I will discuss how evolutionary and developmental approaches to 
human cognition are now in a position to substantially alter the central paradigms 
currently used in cognitive science. 
 
 
 
 Teleosemantics 
 
Ruth Millikan (in Millikan, 1984) was the first philosopher who recognized that no 
satisfactory account of intentionality, (ie: of the meaning or representational value of 
mental states) can be provided without taking into account that these states are the 
result of a Darwinian selection process.  
Mainstream views on intentionality rely on causal accounts: the representational 
contents of beliefs coincide with the external conditions that cause them. For 
example, a certain representation is of a cow because it is a cow that produced this 
representation. There are several problems with this view: it fails to explain the 
capacity of representations to misrepresent, to represent non-existent entities, and to 
represent only certain aspects of the object with which the organism is interacting 
causally.   
Ruth Millikan reoriented our way of thinking about these questions by invoking 
biological concepts. Her idea was that representational function can only be 
understood as the result of an evolutionary process through which certain mappings 
are being selected by virtue of their causal effects on their bearers’ reproductive 
capacity. In this view, minds exist- as a set of mental functions -  because having 
these capacities and the various dispositions they include has modulated (in the 
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past) the reproductive success of the entities that has them. For example, a certain 
visual pattern is categorized as a rabbit because that visual pattern has acquired the 
function to trigger the belief that there is a rabbit only when a rabbit rather than, say,  
a snake,  is present. The normativity inherent to function, Millikan claimed, was in a 
better position to explain misrepresentation and aspectuality than the causalist 
account. 
 
Cognitive functions as  dynamic systems 
 
Given the promise of this approach, why did teleosemantics (and, more 
generally,  the  biological approach to mind) fail to become a standard philosophical 
and psychological method to analyse mental function ?  Furthermore, why are 
teleological analyses so sparse in areas beyond belief formation, for example in 
learning, emoting and acting ?1 These domains obviously involve purpose, 
motivation, and adaptive context, which make teleological considerations crucial. 
Here is one possible explanation : these domains reveal a fact about cognitive 
adaptation that a disposition such as belief might mask:  mental “states” are not 
static; they are dynamic entities whose function is  to adapt to a changing 
environment. In my view, a cognitive scientist or a philosopher who recognize  the 
dynamic character of the cognitive responses to selective pressures,   ar facing  two 
difficulties. 
The first is that teleosemantics in its Millikanian version is ignoring the biophysical 
and informational constraints in which cognition had to evolve.2 Just as 
understanding posture and gait in terrestrial organisms presupposes understanding 
the physical constraints with which an optimally functioning system has to comply ( a 
certain algorithm reflecting in which limits bodily mass, acceleration, velocity , bone 
length, etc. can vary,  given a specific physical and biological environment), 
understanding the evolution of learning presupposes understanding the kind of  
constraints that apply to information-processing systems. There are two things to 
consider in this respect. First, information is present in nature and up for grabs; in 
Dretske’s account,3 it is the converse of a regular causal relation between two 
physical events; extracting this relation allows recruiting an event as a way to 
represent another. Second, information is crucially relevant to survival. This leads to 
suppose that specific pressures for representing certain facts might explain brain 
architecture in each species. In addition, one might hypothesize that the very format 
in which information is stored and retrieved plausibly reflects the conditions in which 
information was initially extracted in phylogeny. As long as biological causality is 
taken to be irreducible to physical causality, these questions cannot be posed, much 
less addressed.4 
The second difficulty is that even when the importance of information for 
survival is recognized,  there is at present no established paradigm of how dynamical 
capture and storage of information should be modeled; a computational 
representation of dynamic entities is a topic for current research, not a textbook set of 
                                            
1   There are some exceptions: In philosophy, see Sterelny, (2003), Papineau (2003), De Sousa (2000, 
2004 ), Proust (2005). In psychology, see in particular Prinz (1987 & 1990). In cognitive anthropology, 
see Sperber (2000), and Orrigi & Sperber, (2000). 
2 See Millikan (1993). 
3 See Dretske (1981 & 1988). 
4 For a defense of this claim, see Proust (1997). 
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universally recognized methods. As many analysts of cognitive science recognize,5 
taking a dynamic-selectionist view of the mental in a computationally oriented 
science of the mind is one of the major challenges for the years to come. One 
interesting line of research is the mathematical modeling approach adopted in 
dynamic systems theories (specifically “Artificial Life”). The idea behind this approach 
is that the evolution of a system over time depends crucially on the evolution of the 
other systems with which it is interacting. The complex dynamic situation generated 
by the coupling of  the co-evolving systems can only be captured by new 
mathematical tools, like dynamic systems theory, and viability theory;  they aim to 
discover invariants in the co-evoluting systems’ behaviors. These tools are only 
starting to become available. The question remains how these invariants can be used 
towards an informational-representational account of mental function. 
  Dynamical models will only be useful if they are applied at the right kind of 
level, which requires a tight interaction between mathematicians, biologists and 
cognitive neuroscientists. Here evolutionary biology might have a crucial role to play  
in determining the format in which information is stored and retrieved in the primate 
brain ; comparative biology also seems to be in a position to offer a major 
contribution to this endeavor.  
 
Embodied cognition 
 
An indication that cognitive scientists are now coming to realize the importance of 
both issues – the biophysical constraints in which cognition is evolving and the 
dynamical format in which information is extracted – lies in the fact that a new 
approach to cognition is currently gaining currency.  Called “Embodied cognition”, it 
advances the view that one cannot understand cognition without considering how the 
organism as a whole (including its body and  its associated sensorimotor capacities) 
is interacting with its environment. Indeed it is a consequence of a teleological view 
of the mind that cognitive operations have been selected on a background of existing 
adaptations and of stable features in the external world.   
Such a view was already implicit in the foundational role that Wolfgang Prinz and 
his group6 attributed to the ideomotor principle in Experimental Psychology. This 
principle states that perception and action are not isolated mental functions; they are 
operate jointly and can be shown to share a common representational code. Another 
early attempt at recognizing the role of distal elements in cognition was made by the 
proponents of cognitive situatedness in social science.  Echoing the biologists’ 
concerns, these socials scientists insisted that the physical and social context play a 
central role in the development and functioning of the mind. 7 Some proponents of 
this view  endorsed a more radical claim, inspired by Gibson’s ecological theory of 
perception: representations play no role in cognition, because the information is 
directly made available to the system by its interaction with the environment.  This 
radical claim however leaves us in the dark as to how such an interaction is possible 
– how are “know-hows” being acquired and updated if no information is stored in 
memory?8 
                                            
5 See for example Clark (2000). 
6 See inter alia Prinz (1987) and (1990). 
7 Cf. Lucy Suchman, (1987), whose work influenced research in “embodied robotics”.  
8 See Clark (1999) for a discussion  of the anti- representationalist stance of  “radical embodiment” 
proponents.  
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 Not suprisingly, researchers in embodied cognition favor dynamical models : a 
mind predicts how successful an action will be by reenacting covertly previous 
performances of the same type; representations thus must be dynamic entities. But 
how can we analyse them ? Larry Barsalou’s  (2005) work on abstract thinking is 
particulary revealing of the tension between the requirements of dynamic modeling 
and the need for a representational account of mental functions; he suggests that 
what he calls perceptual symbol systems, i.e. the combination of simulatory 
perceptual sequences based on the subject’s earlier encounters with the relevant 
experience, underlie the capacity to conceptualize, to reason, and to abstract new 
knowledge from previously acquired knowledge Abstractions, in his view, are not 
stored in memory, but constructed online and then discarded. Unconscious as well as 
conscious reenactments might therefore underlie memory, conceptualization, text 
comprehension and reasoning. 
 
These new emergent models are all motivated by the view that biology might offer 
revolutionary insights  into mental function.  Given the observations above, old 
questions, such as “ what is information ?” can only be adequately adressed by 
physicists and mathematicians in collaboration with neurobiologists and evolutionary 
biologists. New ones will soon have to be raised as well ;   for instance, should  we 
retain the traditional picture of the mind neatly divided into “faculties”, such as 
perception, action, reason, and imagination  ? Or will the embodied cognition 
research suggest other ways of carving up mental functions ? Here too evolutionary 
biology will also have a major contribution to offer. 
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